

Interagency Group/Countermeasures

Washington, D.C. 20505

X D/ICS-83-0725  
6 September 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Invitees

25X1 FROM:

  
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Minutes of Seventh IG/CM Meeting,  
22 August 1983


Attached are the final minutes of the seventh IG/CM meeting.

25X1 Attachment:  
a/s



25X1 Regraded Unclassified when  
attachment is removed.

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SUMMARY OF IG/CM MEETING

22 August 1983

25X1 1. The seventh meeting of the IG/CM was convened at 1400 hours, 22 August 1983, by Chairman (DUSD-Policy) Richard G. Stilwell, General, USA (Ret.). A listing of individuals attending is attached. [ ]

2. In his opening remarks, General Stilwell:

25X1 a. Introduced and welcomed [ ] as the new Chief  
25X1 of the Community Counterintelligence Staff, Intelligence Community Staff  
25X1 and therefore, ex officio, the new Executive Secretary to the Interagency  
25X1 Group for Countermeasures. General Stilwell noted that [ ]  
25X1 distinguished CI background and experience as a former Commander of the  
25X1 USAF's Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) would serve him  
25X1 particularly well in his present assignments. [ ] remarked that  
25X1 he looked forward to working with and serving the needs of the  
Intelligence Community. [ ]

b. Reviewed the 1 August meeting of the SIG(I) which was called to consider the Countermeasures Organization Study recommended by the IG/CM. The Chairman indicated he had summarized the conclusions and recommendations of the Study which were well received by the SIG(I) members. He reported that subsequent to some detailed discussion, the SIG(I) charged the IG/CM with moving quickly to address issues raised by the Study. He further advised that some of the issues mentioned to the SIG(I) as initial topics for IG/CM consideration were listed as agenda items for instant meeting. [ ]

25X1 c. Introduced the balance of the scheduled agenda. [ ]

3. The issues which follow were raised in the Countermeasures Organization Study. The Chairman emphasized this was not a complete list but representative of issues recommended to the SIG(I) for early consideration.

25X1 a. Countermeasures Macro Resource Data. The Chairman noted that the SIG(I) was particularly interested in determining the feasibility of establishing a mechanism for better identification and quantification of CM and CM-related resource data to improve the effectiveness of CM program resource decisions. The Chairman stated he advised the SIG(I) that the magnitude of such a study, recommended in the CM Organization Study, appeared enormous and would probably take at least a year to complete. General Stilwell suggested that the first step was to define the problem and structure the tasks. He proposed that a volunteer contract employee [ ] undertake the preliminary organization

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steps beginning in the first week of October. He further asked attendees to provide the names of respective agency points of contact to work with [ ] CIA, asked for clarification on what such a study was intended to accomplish. The Chairman responded that there is a need to get a better handle--a macro understanding--on what resources are expended on countermeasures and what these resource impacts are. He suggested that individual agency consensus on the CM Organization Study revealed all thought it worthwhile to determine whether CM macro resource data management was doable. [ ]

**ACTION:**

IG/CM Secretariat arrange for [ ] employment for the cited task and provide administrative support and guidance.

[ ] begin organization for task accomplishment circa 3 October 1983.

IG/CM members and invitees provide the IG/CM Secretariat by 15 September 1983 the names and phone number of respective agency points of contact to work the CM Macro Resource Data Study. [ ]

b. **Communications Security (COMSEC):** The IG/CM Chairman highlighted three areas of COMSEC concern mentioned during SIG(I) discussions of the CM Organization Study: dual (DoD + Commerce) versus single (DoD) executive agent responsibility for COMSEC; clarification of roles of the National COMSEC Committee (NCSC) and advisory groups set up by extant PD-24; and systematizing means of determining and stating COMSEC equipment requirements. General Stilwell stated since the first two concerns involve Presidential Decision-24 (PD-24) which is being redrafted by the NSC, the SIG(I) Chairman had requested the NSC representative to pursue resolution of those issues. Mr. Ken deGraffenreid, NSC, amplified by advising: The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs had directed the NSC Staff to update PD-24; the SIG(I) Chairman had therefore asked that deGraffenreid be responsible for ensuring that relevant CM Organization Study recommendations be included as input to the NSC working group charged with redrafting PD-24; the work of this group will involve converting the former PD-24 into a proposed National Security Decision Directive; an initial draft should be completed by mid September 1983; comments and coordination will be appropriately solicited from the Community and affected agencies; weighty matters constituting the NSDD will probably also require consideration before a meeting of the National Security Council. The Chairman subsequently advised he would ask the NCSC to examine the third COMSEC concern cited above and report its findings to the IG/CM. Attendees agreed with these courses of action. [ ]

**ACTION:**

The NSC representative will ensure that relevant CM Organization Study COMSEC recommendations are considered as input to the revision of PD-24. A progress report is requested by the next IG/CM meeting.

The Chairman will request the NCSC to examine the adequacy of means for determining COMSEC equipment requirements. An interim progress report will be provided at the next IG/CM meeting. [ ]

c. **Industrial Security:** The Chairman focused on the CM Organization Study conclusion that there should be an interagency mechanism to facilitate and expedite interagency coordination of industrial security matters. He suggested that DoD, as the behemoth in this arena, establish a forum among the 18 user agencies, with CIA and DoE participation. There was consensus on this course of action. [ ]

**ACTION:** The OSD representative will take lead action in structuring a forum to address, in part, those security matters mentioned in the CM Organization Study, i.e., minimize differing security requirements levied on contractors, accelerate interagency coordination on security matters, and assess the adequacy of uniformity of industrial security training. An interim report is requested at the next IG/CM meeting. [ ]

d. **Computer Security:** General Stilwell advised of the SIG(I) impression that the ICS Computer Security Study led by [ ] is an ambitious but necessary action. The Chairman opined that the enormity of the problem suggests no single study will completely resolve deficiencies. Nevertheless, he had suggested that the IG/CM stay on the sidelines until [ ] study is complete and then examine it for completeness or gaps prior to initiating any actions. There was IG/CM member consensus on this approach. [ ]

**ACTION:** None pending completion of the [ ] computer security project. [ ]

e. **Personnel Security:** General Stilwell reported SIG(I) interest in follow-on actions in this area. DoJ has been designated the lead agency for this aspect of implementing NSDD-84. Ms. Mary Lawton, DoJ, summarized her report to the SIG(I): A small working group of representatives from Defense, Energy, Treasury, DoJ and OPM is developing a paper for presentation to the SIG(I). The paper will present, for higher level decision, a number of considered options for accomplishing the objectives of NSDD-84. The substance of these options involve many points raised in the CM Organization Study, and fundamental decisions on these points are essential prior to the drafting of an Executive Order. A coordinated draft options paper may be completed by year end. [ ]

**ACTION:** DoJ, as an IG/CM participant, will continue to ensure that IG/CM-developed input is considered in the development of NSDD-84 related decision papers on personnel security. [ ]

f. **Operations Security (OPSEC) Advisory Committee:** General Stilwell advised he and Mr. deGraffenreid had reported to the SIG(I) on the status of the proposed NSDD on OPSEC. The NSDD is on "hold" at the NSC because many feel it is more hortative vice directive in nature. A key feature of the proposed NSDD is the establishment of the cited committee. The SIG(I) Chairman wants the committee established regardless of the ultimate disposition of the proposed OPSEC NSDD. Accordingly, General Stilwell proposed that since DoD is the largest player, it should assume responsibility for development of a plan to establish the OPSEC committee, i.e., a charter, terms of reference, membership, etc., and report back to the IG/CM. Suggestions contained in the Organization Study should be considered. There was consensus on this course of action. [ ]

**ACTION:** The OSD representative will develop a draft plan for presentation to the IG/CM in October 1983. A progress report is requested at the next IG/CM meeting. [ ]

4. The Chairman next asked the IG/CM Secretary to lead a discussion of the agenda items on IG/CM-related policy or legal recommendations contained in the July 1982 study on "Capabilities Against the Hostile Intelligence Threat, 1983-1988." The Secretary explained that 22 of the 106 Study recommendations for improving our capability to counter the threat were policy or legal issues pertinent to countermeasures. Six of the 22 had yet to be directly addressed by the IG/CM; thus, they were presently before the IG/CM. Resultant discussions are summarized as follows: [ ]

a. **Warning System for Foreign Aircraft Reconnaissance:** Since the "Capabilities Study" publication, a number of actions have been taken to improve both policy and notification regarding foreign aircraft reconnaissance. Moreover, the recently completed CM Organization Study concluded that the CONUS warning system was satisfactory, military indications and warning (I&W) systems overseas were satisfactory, and development of additional warning systems outside the U.S. were impractical. Further, the more focused questions on this issue are whether all potential consumers of such warning are aware of its availability and whether those who are aware are taking sufficient precautions. Mr. deGraffenreid noted that the IG/CM-recommended NSDD on foreign overflight of the U.S. would soon be signed by the President, thus formally establishing an Overflight Security Committee. [ ]

**ACTION:** The IG/CM consensus therefore concluded that: "no special advanced aircraft reconnaissance warning system is presently required." The soon-to-be-established Overflight Security Committee (OSC) should

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pursue the CM Organization Study questions of awareness and use of established systems and report findings to the IG/CM. The IG/CM Secretariat will ensure the OSC is provided this charge. [ ]



**ACTION:** The IG/CM consensus was that the soon-to-be-established OPSEC Advisory Committee (OAC) should, early on, examine the need for policy clarification and report to the IG/CM. The IG/CM Secretariat will ensure the OAC is provided this charge. [ ]

**c. National Strategy on HOIS Collection of Industrial and High Tech Data/Materials:** The Secretary reviewed for attendees the existence of the Senior Interagency Group-Technology Transfer (SIG-TT) and of National Security Study Directive (NSSD) 1-83, "US Technology Transfer Policy." Research has indicated that the SIG-TT and NSSD 1-83 are to directly address the technology transfer issues contained in the "Capabilities Study" and develop implementing policy guidance in a resulting National Security Decision Directive (NSDD). [ ]

**ACTION:** The IG/CM consensus was that this issue, from the "Capabilities Study," would be addressed by the SIG-TT. [ ]

**d. Direct Funding Mechanism for Communications Relay Satellite Protection:** [ ] NSA, was asked to comment on the need for direct funding for communications protection devices on satellites used by Government contractors and other Government-related users. He suggested that before the question of direct funding is addressed, we need to have a clearly understood strategy for protection. He stated that DoD and NSA need to define our protection strategy. NSA is doing the initial work in this regard and will work also with DoD and the NCSC. [ ]

**ACTION:** General Stilwell will research who has cognizance for protection policy and report back to the IG/CM. [ ]

**e. Computer Security:** The Secretary indicated that the three issues on this subject, which are addressed in the "Capabilities Study," fall within the charter established for the ICS Computer Security (COMPUSEC) project led by [ ]

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**ACTION:** The IG/CM consensus was to support the ICS COMPUSEC study as being on the right track and review the study results for further action if required. [ ]

**f. Security and Inspection Programs for SCI-Cleared Contractors:**

The July 1982 "Study" stressed the need for standardizing security criteria and inspection programs applied to Intelligence Community contractors cleared for SCI. The varying requirements imposed on industry by the various agencies and security disciplines were felt to result in unnecessary expense to the Government and confusion about security objectives. Uniform and coordinated standards for each security discipline were encouraged. [ ] SECOM, indicated his Committee has developed many DCIDs in an effort to standardize security criteria. The Chairman suggested the SECOM Chairman reexamine the July 1982 recommendations to determine whether there was need to do anything further and report his findings to the IG/CM, addressing progress in each applicable security discipline, i.e., TEMPEST, TSCM, Physical Security, etc. [ ]

**ACTION:** SECOM Chairman is to brief the IG/CM as requested as soon as practicable. [ ]

5. The IG/CM Chairman introduced the final scheduled agenda item and asked the lead agency representative to comment. [ ] NSA, indicated that most agencies responding to the NSA proposal for a reinstituted and expanded crypto access program found it generally acceptable. In addition to the polygraph aspect, which is for the present moot, a major concern was the need for a cost/benefit determination. NSA concurs with the OSD position that the NCSC should be requested to make a cost/benefit analysis and report back to the IG/CM within 30-60 days. The NSA representative advised that the issue of aperiodic use of the polygraph in conjunction with the crypto access program would have to be held in abeyance until after April 1984. Congressional restrictions on DoD polygraph policy contained in the Senator John H. Chafee amendment pertain. In regard to the use of the polygraph, Mr. deGraffenreid volunteered that NSDD-84 was not a dead letter since the President had recently reiterated his commitment to it. [ ] went on to opine that subsequent to a cost benefit analysis, other comments on the proposal (considered minor in comparison) could undoubtedly be resolved through coordination and compromise. In recapping the reported agency positions on the NSA proposal, the Chairman noted that the Department of the Navy had registered decided reservations about the proposal. [ ]

**ACTION:** The Chairman will prepare correspondence to the NCSC requesting their assessment of whether the NSA proposal should be reinstituted without the polygraph provision. [ ]

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6. Two ad hoc agenda items were also discussed:

a. The Chairman asked Mr. deGraffenreid what other mechanisms short of a Presidentially signed NSDD could be used to authoritatively promulgate national security-related policy. General Stilwell explained that many issues with which the IG/CM deals require national level authorization but not necessarily from the Presidential level. Mr. deGraffenreid indicated NSDDs were a viable instrument whose use should not be discounted solely because of the Presidential signature provision. As long as the NSDDs were more directive than hortative and called for implementation by a large part of the Government, they will remain useful tools. He further stated that as a matter of preference, Judge Clark was reluctant to sign NSC policy memoranda directing actions be taken by Government agencies. He observed that it has been a long time since National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) had been issued, but believed that they are still operative instruments.

**ACTION:** Mr. deGraffenreid will research the status of NSCIDs and other intermediate authoritative means short of the Presidential decision level which can be used for promulgating national security policy. A status report is requested at the next IG/CM meeting.

b. The NSA representative, responding to the Chairman's interrogative, indicated the revised NACSI 4000 concerning COMSEC policy only needed one more coordination signature.

**ACTION:** NSA will continue the coordination process.

6. The meeting adjourned at 1525 hours.

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# ATTENDEES

IG/CM Meeting, 22 August 1983

Room 6W02, [REDACTED]

## NAME

## ORGANIZATION

STILWELL, Richard G.

OSD

SNIDER, L. Britt

OSD

[REDACTED]  
DU HADWAY, Thomas

FBI

CORNETT, John P.

Air Force

THOMAS, James P.

Air Force

deGRAFFENREID, Kenneth

NSC

WINGFIELD, Robert

DoE

AURELIO, Frank

Army

SECOM

SECOM

MACDONALD, Donald

State

CURL, Richard E.

State

WHARTON, Royal

State

BERKIN, Gerald

Navy

GUENTHER, John

Marine Corps

LAWTON, Mary C.

DoJ

GARFINKEL, Steven

Info. Sec. Oversight Office

## Secretariat

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CCIS/ICS: [REDACTED]

Distribution of Minutes of Seventh Meeting of IG/CM (D/ICS-83-0725):

1 - Gen. Stilwell, OSD

5 - Mr. Snider, OSD (to be distributed to Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps)

1 - Mr. Du Hadway, FBI

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[REDACTED] CIA

1 - Mr. Macdonald, State

25X1

[REDACTED] NSA

1 - Mr. deGraffenreid, NSC

25X1

[REDACTED] (for JCS)

25X1

[REDACTED] SECDEF

1 - Ms. Lawton, DoJ

1 - Mr. Cinquegrana, DoJ

1 - Mr. McBrien, Treasury

1 - Mr. Peterson, Commerce

1 - Mr. Wingfield, Energy

1 - Mr. Krohn, FAA

1 - CAPT Peebles, Coast Guard

1 - Mr. Garfinkel, ISOO

1 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - Ex. Dir.

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